FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Since its establishment, the People's Republic has worked vigorously to win international support for its position that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. In the early 1970s, Beijing was recognized diplomatically by most world powers. Beijing assumed the China seat in the United Nations in 1971 and has since become increasingly active in multilateral organizations. Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, and the United States did so in 1979. As of March 2008, the number of countries that had diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 171, while 23 maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
After
the founding of the P.R.C., China's foreign policy initially focused
on solidarity with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.
In 1950, China sent the People's Liberation Army into North Korea
as "volunteers" to help North Korea halt the UN offensive
that was approaching the Yalu River. After the conclusion of the
Korean conflict, China sought to balance its identification as
a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations
with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in
Southeast Asia.
In the
1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among
communist parties and in the developing world generally. Following
the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969
on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet
Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic
position.
In late
1978, the Chinese also became concerned over Vietnam's efforts
to establish open control over Laos and Cambodia. In response
to the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China fought
a brief border war with Vietnam (February-March 1979) with the
stated purpose of "teaching Vietnam a lesson."
Chinese
anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following
the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Sharp
differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over
Soviet support for Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the
Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia--the so-called "three
obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.
In the
1970s and 1980s China sought to create a secure regional and global
environment for itself and to foster good relations with countries
that could aid its economic development. To this end, China looked
to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for
help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized
as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.
China
maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower hegemony,"
focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the
Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba, but
it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent
of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with
the West, China continued to follow closely economic and other
positions of the Third World nonaligned movement, although China
was not a formal member.
In the
immediate aftermath of Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, many
countries reduced their diplomatic contacts with China as well
as their economic assistance programs. In response, China worked
vigorously to expand its relations with foreign countries, and
by late 1990, had reestablished normal relations with almost all
nations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991,
China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the
former Soviet Union.
In recent years, Chinese leaders have been regular travelers to all parts of the globe, and China has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral organizations. Closer to home, China has made efforts to reduce tensions in Asia, hosting the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, cultivating a more cooperative relationship with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum. China has also taken steps to improve relations with countries in South Asia, including India. Following Premier Wen's 2005 visit to India, the two sides moved to increase commercial and cultural ties, as well as to resolve longstanding border disputes. The November 2006 visit of President Hu was the first state visit by a Chinese head of state to India in 10 years.
China has likewise improved ties with Russia, with Presidents Putin and Hu exchanging visits to Beijing and Moscow in April 2006 and March 2007. A second round of Russia-China joint military exercises is scheduled for fall 2007. China has played a prominent role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional grouping that includes Russia and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Beijing has resolved many of its border and maritime disputes, notably including a November 1997 agreement with Russia that resolved almost all outstanding border issues and a 2000 agreement with Vietnam to resolve differences over their maritime border, though disagreements remain over islands in the South China Sea. Relations with Japan improved following Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's October 2006 visit to Beijing, although longstanding and emotionally charged disputes over history and competing claims to portions of the East China Sea remain sources of tension.
While in many ways Sudan's primary diplomatic patron, China has played a constructive role in support of peacekeeping operations in Southern Sudan and pledged to contribute an engineering unit in support of UN operations in Darfur. China has stated publicly that it shares the international community's concern over Iran's nuclear program and has voted in support of UN sanctions resolutions on Iran. Set against this has been an effort on the part of China to maintain close ties to countries such as Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela, which are sources of oil and other resources and which welcome China's non-conditional assistance and investment.
DEFENSE
Establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern
weapons and doctrine was the last of the "Four Modernizations"
announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by Deng Xiaoping. In keeping
with Deng's mandate to reform, the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
which includes the strategic nuclear forces, army, navy, and air
force, has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and
introduced modern methods in such areas as recruitment and manpower,
strategy, and education and training.
Following
the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, ideological correctness was
temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military
affairs. Reform and modernization appear to have since resumed
their position as the PLA's priority objectives, although the
armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP remains a leading concern.
The Chinese
military is trying to transform itself from a land-based power,
centered on a vast ground force, to a smaller, mobile, high-tech
military capable of mounting defensive operations beyond its coastal
borders.
China's power-projection capability is limited but has grown over recent years. China has acquired some advanced weapons systems, including Sovremmeny destroyers, SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft, and Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia. However, much of its air and naval forces continues to be based on 1960s-era technology. As the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review, released February 2006, noted, the U.S. shares with other countries a concern about the pace, scope, and direction of China's military modernization. We view military exchanges, visits, and other forms of engagement are useful tools in promoting transparency, provided they have substance and are fully reciprocal. Regularized exchanges and contact also have the significant benefit of building confidence, reducing the possibility of accidents, and providing the lines of communication that are essential in ensuring that episodes such as the April 2001 EP-3 aircraft incident do not escalate into major crises. During their April 2006 meeting, President Bush and President Hu agreed to increase officer exchanges and to begin a strategic nuclear dialogue between STRATCOM and the Chinese military's strategic missile command. U.S. and Chinese militaries are also considering ways in which we might cooperate on disaster assistance relief.
Nuclear
Weapons and Arms Control Policy
Nuclear Weapons. In 1955, Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party
decided to proceed with a nuclear weapons program; it was developed
with Soviet assistance until 1960. After its first nuclear test
in October 1964, Beijing deployed a modest but potent ballistic
missile force, including land- and sea-based intermediate-range
and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
China
became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s. Beijing
joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July
1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers,
but announced in September 1992 that it would no longer participate
because of the U.S. decision to sell F-16A/B aircraft to Taiwan.
China
was the first state to pledge "no first use" of nuclear
weapons. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in 1984 and pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing
of nuclear weapons in 1986. China acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional
extension in 1995. In 1996, it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and agreed to seek an international ban on the production
of fissile nuclear weapons material. To date, China has not ratified
the CTBT.
In 1996,
China committed not to provide assistance to un-safeguarded nuclear
facilities. China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT Exporters
(Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member in
October 1997. The Zangger Committee is a group that meets to list
items that should be subject to IAEA inspections if exported by
countries that have, as China has, signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. In September 1997, China issued detailed nuclear export
control regulations. China began implementing regulations establishing
controls over nuclear-related dual-use items in 1998. China also
has decided not to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran
(even under safeguards), and will complete existing cooperation,
which is not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short
period. In May 2004, with the support of the United States, China
became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Based
on significant, tangible progress with China on nuclear nonproliferation,
President Clinton in 1998 took steps to bring into force the 1985
U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
Chemical
Weapons. China is not a member of the Australia Group, an informal
and voluntary arrangement made in 1985 to monitor developments
in the proliferation of dual-use chemicals and to coordinate export
controls on key dual-use chemicals and equipment with weapons
applications. In April 1997, however, China ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and, in September 1997, promulgated a
new chemical weapons export control directive. In October 2002,
China promulgated updated regulations on dual-use chemical agents,
and now controls all the major items on the Australia Group control
list.
Missiles. Although it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the multinational effort to restrict the proliferation of missiles, in March 1992 China undertook to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. China reaffirmed this commitment in 1994, and pledged not to transfer MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles. In November 2000, China committed not to assist in any way the development by other countries of MTCR-class missiles. However, in August 29, 2003, the U.S. Government imposed missile proliferation sanctions lasting two years on the Chinese company China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) after determining that it was knowingly involved in the transfer of equipment and technology controlled under Category II of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex that contributed to MTCR-class missiles in a non-MTCR country.
In December 2003, the P.R.C. promulgated comprehensive new export control regulations governing exports of all categories of sensitive technologies.
U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS
From Liberation
to the Shanghai Communiqué
As the PLA armies moved south to complete the communist conquest
of China in 1949, the American Embassy followed the Nationalist
government headed by Chiang Kai-shek, finally moving to Taipei
later that year. U.S. consular officials remained in mainland
China. The new P.R.C. Government was hostile to this official
American presence, and all U.S. personnel were withdrawn from
the mainland in early 1950. Any remaining hope of normalizing
relations ended when U.S. and Chinese communist forces fought
on opposing sides in the Korean conflict.
Beginning
in 1954 and continuing until 1970, the United States and China
held 136 meetings at the ambassadorial level, first at Geneva
and later at Warsaw. In the late 1960s, U.S. and Chinese political
leaders decided that improved bilateral relations were in their
common interest. In 1969, the United States initiated measures
to relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral
contact. On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced that his
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger,
had made a secret trip to Beijing to initiate direct contact with
the Chinese leadership and that he, the President, had been invited
to visit China.
In February
1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai.
At the conclusion of his trip, the U.S. and Chinese Governments
issued the "Shanghai Communiqué," a statement
of their foreign policy views. (For the complete text of the Shanghai
Communiqué, see the Department of State Bulletin, March
20, 1972).
In the
Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full
normalization of diplomatic relations. The U.S. acknowledged the
Chinese position that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is
part of China. The statement enabled the U.S. and China to temporarily
set aside the "crucial question obstructing the normalization
of relations"--Taiwan--and to open trade and other contacts.
Liaison
Office, 1973-78
In May 1973, in an effort to build toward the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations, the U.S. and China established the
United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart
Chinese office in Washington, DC. In the years between 1973 and
1978, such distinguished Americans as David Bruce, George H.W.
Bush, Thomas Gates, and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the
USLO with the personal rank of Ambassador.
President
Ford visited China in 1975 and reaffirmed the U.S. interest in
normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office
in 1977, President Carter again reaffirmed the interest expressed
in the Shanghai Communiqué. The United States and China
announced on December 15, 1978, that the two governments would
establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.
Normalization
In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The U.S. reiterated
the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese
position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part
of China; Beijing acknowledged that the American people would
continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial
contacts with the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act made
the necessary changes in U.S. domestic law to permit such unofficial
relations with Taiwan to flourish.
U.S.-China
Relations Since Normalization
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington,
DC, initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges, which
continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral
agreements--especially in the fields of scientific, technological,
and cultural interchange and trade relations. Since early 1979,
the United States and China have initiated hundreds of joint research
projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation
in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.
On March
1, 1979, the United States and China formally established embassies
in Beijing and Washington, DC. During 1979, outstanding private
claims were resolved, and a bilateral trade agreement was concluded.
Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's
visit with an August 1979 trip to China. This visit led to agreements
in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and
textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.
As a consequence
of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, U.S.
dialogue with China broadened to cover a wide range of issues,
including global and regional strategic problems, political-military
questions, including arms control, UN and other multilateral organization
affairs, and international narcotics matters.
The expanding
relationship that followed normalization was threatened in 1981
by Chinese objections to the level of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in
an effort to resolve Chinese questions about America's unofficial
relations with Taiwan. Eight months of negotiations produced the
U.S.-China joint communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this
third communiqué, the U.S. stated its intention to reduce
gradually the level of arms sales to Taiwan, and the Chinese described
as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful
resolution to the Taiwan question. Meanwhile, Vice President Bush
visited China in May 1982.
High-level
exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing U.S.-China
relations in the 1980s. President Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang
made reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian
traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a Chinese
head of state. Vice President Bush visited China in October 1985
and opened the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, the U.S.'s fourth
consular post in China. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials
occurred between 1985-89, capped by President Bush's visit to
Beijing in February 1989.
In the
period before the June 3-4, 1989 crackdown, a large and growing
number of cultural exchange activities undertaken at all levels
gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's
cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous Chinese
professional and official delegations visited the United States
each month. Many of these exchanges continued after Tiananmen.
Bilateral
Relations After Tiananmen
Following the Chinese authorities' brutal suppression of demonstrators
in June 1989, the U.S. and other governments enacted a number
of measures to express their condemnation of China's blatant violation
of the basic human rights of its citizens. The U.S. suspended
high-level official exchanges with China and weapons exports from
the U.S. to China. The U.S. also imposed a number of economic
sanctions. In the summer of 1990, at the G-7 Houston summit, Western
nations called for renewed political and economic reforms in China,
particularly in the field of human rights.
Tiananmen
disrupted the U.S.-China trade relationship, and U.S. investors'
interest in China dropped dramatically. The U.S. Government also
responded to the political repression by suspending certain trade
and investment programs on June 5 and 20, 1989. Some sanctions
were legislated; others were executive actions. Examples include:
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The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA)--new activities in China were suspended from June 1989 until January 2001, when then-President Clinton lifted this suspension.
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Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC)--new activities suspended since June 1989.
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Development Bank Lending/IMF Credits--the United States does not support development bank lending and will not support IMF credits to China except for projects that address basic human needs.
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Munitions List Exports--subject to certain exceptions, no licenses may be issued for the export of any defense article on the U.S. Munitions List. This restriction may be waived upon a presidential national interest determination.
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Arms Imports--import of defense articles from China was banned after the imposition of the ban on arms exports to China. The import ban was subsequently waived by the Administration and re-imposed on May 26, 1994. It covers all items on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives' Munitions Import List.
In 1996, the P.R.C. conducted military exercises in waters close
to Taiwan in an apparent effort at intimidation. The United States
dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. Subsequently,
tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished, and relations between
the U.S. and China have improved, with increased high-level exchanges
and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights,
nonproliferation, and trade. Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin
visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the first state
visit to the U.S. by a Chinese president since 1985. In connection
with that visit, the two sides reached agreement on implementation
of their 1985 agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation, as well
as a number of other issues. Former President Clinton visited
China in June 1998. He traveled extensively in China, and direct
interaction with the Chinese people included live speeches and
a radio show, allowing the President to convey first-hand to the
Chinese people a sense of American ideals and values.
Relations between the U.S. and China were severely strained by the tragic accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually improve. In October 1999, the two sides reached agreement on humanitarian payments for families of those who died and those who were injured as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China. Relations further cooled when, in April 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft flying over international waters south of China. The EP-3 was able to make an emergency landing on China's Hainan Island despite extensive damage; the P.R.C. aircraft crashed with the loss of its pilot. Following extensive negotiations, the crew of the EP-3 was allowed to leave China 11 days later, but the U.S. aircraft was not permitted to depart for another 3 months.
Subsequently, the relationship gradually improved. President George W. Bush visited China in February 2002 and met with President Jiang Zemin in Crawford, Texas in October. President Bush hosted Premier Wen Jiabao in Washington in December 2003. President Bush first met Hu Jintao in his new capacity as P.R.C. President on the margins of the G-8 Summit in Evian in June 2003, and at subsequent international fora, such as the September 2004 APEC meeting in Chile, the July 2005 G-8 summit in Scotland, and the September 2005 UN General Assembly meetings in New York. President Bush traveled to China in November 2005, an official visit that was reciprocated in April 2006 when President Hu met with President Bush in Washington.
U.S. China policy has been consistent. For seven consecutive administrations, Democratic and Republican, U.S. policy has been to encourage China's opening and integration into the global system. As a result, China has moved from being a relatively isolated and poor country to one that is a key participant in international institutions and a major trading nation. The United States encourages China to play an active role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other countries to support and strengthen the international system that has enabled China's success. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has noted, "America has reason to welcome a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China. We want China as a global partner, able and willing to match its growing capabilities to its international responsibilities." Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte and other senior State Department officials engage in regular and intensive discussions with their P.R.C. counterparts through the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue. The Senior Dialogue covers the entire range of issues in the bilateral relationship, as well as global issues of shared concern.
China has an important role to play in global, regional, and bilateral counterterrorism efforts, and has supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9-11) in New York City and Washington, DC, China offered strong public support for the war on terrorism and has been an important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Shortly after 9-11, the United States and China also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue, the most recent round of which was held in Washington in November 2005 and focused on the threat of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Inspections under the Container Security Initiative (CSI) are now underway at the major ports of Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. China has also agreed to participate in the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, a critical part of our efforts to detect the flow of nuclear materials. China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. China participated in both the Iraq Neighbors and International Compact with Iraq meetings in 2007 and has voiced strong support for the Government of Iraq following the country's December 2005 parliamentary elections. China has pledged $25 million to Iraqi reconstruction and taken measures to forgive Iraq's sovereign debt to China.
The U.S. and China have cooperated with growing effectiveness on various aspects of law enforcement, including computer crime, intellectual property rights enforcement, human smuggling, and corruption. The most recent meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Liaison Group on law enforcement cooperation took place in Washington in June 2007.
China and the U.S. have also been working closely with the international community to address threats to global security, such as those posed by North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs. China has played a constructive role in hosting the Six-Party Talks and in brokering the February 2007 agreement on Initial Actions. The U.S. looks to Beijing to use its unique influence with Pyongyang to ensure that North Korea implements fully its commitments under the September 2005 Statement of Principles. China has publicly stated that it does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and has voted in support of sanctions resolutions on Iran at UN Security Council. On these and other important issues, such as the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the U.S. expects China to join with the international community in finding solutions. China's participation is critical to efforts to combat transnational health threats such as avian influenza and HIV/AIDS, and both the U.S. and China play an important role in new multilateral energy initiatives, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership.
While the United States looks forward to a constructive and broad-based relationship with China--a message reiterated by President Bush when he met with President Hu in April 2006 in Washington--there remain areas of potential disagreement. U.S.-China relations are sometimes complicated by events in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The United States does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral steps, by either side, to change the status quo. At the same time, the U.S. has made it clear that cross-strait differences should be resolved peacefully and in a manner acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait. At various points in the past several years, China's has expressed concern about the U.S. making statements on the political evolution of Hong Kong and has stressed that political stability there is paramount for economic growth. The NPC's passage of an Anti-Secession law in March 2005 was viewed as unhelpful to the cause of promoting cross-Strait and regional stability by the U.S. and precipitated critical high-level statements by both sides.
U.S.-China Economic Relations
U.S. direct investment in China covers a wide range of manufacturing sectors,
several large hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals. U.S.
companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint
ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in
China. More than 100 U.S.-based multinationals have projects in China, some with
multiple investments. Cumulative U.S. investment in China is estimated at $57
billion, through the end of 2007, making the United States the sixth-largest
foreign investor in China.
Total two-way trade between China and the United States grew from $33 billion in 1992 to over $386 billion in 2007. The United States is China's second-largest trading partner, and China is now the third-largest trading partner for the United States (after Canada and Mexico). U.S. exports to China have been growing more rapidly than to any other market (up 21% in 2005, 32% in 2006, and 18% in 2007). U.S. imports from China grew 12% in 2007, bringing the U.S. trade deficit with China to $256 billion. Some of the factors that influence the U.S. trade deficit with China include:
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A shift of low-end assembly industries to China from the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia. China has increasingly become the last link in a long chain of value-added production. Because U.S. trade data attributes the full value of a product to the final assembler, Chinese value-added gets over-counted.
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Strong U.S. demand for Chinese goods.
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China's restrictive trade practices, which have included an array of barriers to foreign goods and services, often aimed at protecting state-owned enterprises. Under its WTO accession agreement, China is reducing tariffs and eliminating import licensing requirements, as well as addressing other trade barriers.
The U.S. approach to its economic relations with China has two main elements:
First, the United States seeks to fully integrate China into the global, rules-based economic and trading system. China's participation in the global economy will nurture the process of economic reform, encourage China to take on responsibilities commensurate with its growing influence, and increase China's stake in the stability and prosperity of East Asia.
Second, the United States seeks to expand U.S. exporters' and investors' access to the Chinese market. As China grows and develops, its needs for imported goods and services will grow even more rapidly. The U.S. Government will continue to work with China's leadership to ensure full and timely conformity with China's WTO commitments--including effective protection of intellectual property rights--and to encourage China to move to a flexible, market-based exchange rate in order to further increase U.S. exports of goods, agricultural products, and services to the P.R.C.
In order to achieve these objectives, the U.S. has engaged with China in the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED). The SED is a biannual event, focusing on three major themes:
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Maintaining sustainable growth without large trade imbalances;
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Continued opening of markets to trade, competition, and investment;
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Cooperation on energy security, energy efficiency, and the environmental and health impacts.
The SED is based on recognition by both China and the United States of our mutual interest in strengthening the global economy, addressing global imbalances, and promoting energy security and environmentally sustainable growth. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson led the U.S. delegation during previous SEDs, while Vice Premier Wu Yi led the Chinese delegation. The fourth SED took place in Beijing in April 2008.
U.S. Diplomatic Representation in China
Ambassador--Clark Randt
In addition to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, there are U.S. Consulates General in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenyang.
Embassy
of the People's Republic of China, 2300 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20008 Tel.: (202) 328-2500
Consulate
General of the People's Republic of China-New York 520 12th Avenue
New York, NY 10036 Tel.: (212) 868-7752
Consulate
General of the People's Republic of China-San Francisco1450 Laguna
Street San Francisco, California 94115Tel.: (415) 563-4885
Consulate
General of the People's Republic of China-Houston3417 Montrose
Blvd.Houston, Texas 77006 Tel.: (713) 524-4311
Consulate
General of the People's Republic of China-Chicago100 West Erie
St.
Chicago, Illinois 60610 Tel.: (312) 803-0098
Consulate
General of the People's Republic of China-Los Angeles502 Shatto
Place, Suite 300 Los Angeles, California 90020 Tel.: (213) 807-8088
U.S.
Diplomatic Representation in China
Ambassador--Clark Randt
In
addition to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, there are U.S. Consulates
General in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenyang.
American
Embassy BeijingXiu Shui Bei Jie 3Beijing 100600 People's Republic
of China Tel.: (86) (10) 6532-3831 FAX: (86) (10) 6532-3178
